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Despite its seeming lack of attractiveness to other countries, the German system of quasi-
parity  codetermination  at  company  level  has  thus  far  held  up  fairly  well. We  recount  the 
theoretical arguments for and against this form of codetermination, and survey the evolving 
empirical evidence as to its economic impact. Even if theory and the more recent empirical 
findings hold out the prospect that the apparatus of good corporate governance might include 
employee representation on company boards, caveats attach to the extent of representation 
and the composition of the worker side. But even if the entity has performed better than its 
external  reputation  might  indicate,  it  is  clearly  in  the  process  of  adapting  to  change.  In 
particular, the availability of alternative forms of corporate governance will increasingly shape 
the German institution. 
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1. Motivation 
Germany is the world’s biggest exporter of goods. One of the few products made in 
Germany  that  has  not  been  exported  successfully  is  the  German  system  of 
codetermination  at  company  level  (Unternehmensmitbestimmung),  with 
representatives of employees sitting on company supervisory boards (see Hornung-
Drauss,  2009).  In  contrast  to  employee  representation  via  works  councils  at 
establishment level (betriebliche Mitbestimmung), which is found in many European 
countries in various forms and which has also played a role as a template in the 
formulation of EU legislation on worker involvement,
1 Germany has not been able to 
convince  its  neighbors  or  the  EU  to  adopt  its  system  of  (quasi)  parity  board-level 
representation (although this partly reflects the desire of German employers not to 
seek harmonization to a high level; on which, see Addison, 2009). In short, although 
worker  directors  are  found  in  most  EU  member  states,  their  role  is  usually  less 
comprehensive  than  in  Germany  (for  a  comparative  analysis,  see  Carley,  1998; 
Schulten and Zagelmeyer, 1998). 
What is more, competition has arisen among the various European systems of 
codetermination  since  the  European  Company  Statute  (Council  Regulation 
2157/2001  and  Council  Directive  2001/86/EC)  adopted  by  the  EU  in  2001  gives 
companies  the  option  of  forming  a  European  Company  (Societas  Europaea,  SE) 
which  may  operate  on  a  European-wide  basis.
2  Under  the  legislation,  a  German 
business  establishing  an  SE  can  choose  between  the  current  two-tier  system  of 
corporate  governance  in  Germany  (with  its  separation  of  powers  between  a 
management  board  and  a  supervisory  board)  and  alternative,  one-tier  systems 
common in other EU member states (such as the U.K.) where there is a single board 
                                                 
1  Discussion  of  workplace  codetermination  and  its  effects  is  provided  by  Addison,  Schnabel,  and 
Wagner  (2004).  In  addition  to  the  European  Works  Council  directive  (94/45/EC),  the  practice  of 
German codetermination at establishment level has also guided a number of other European-level 
initiatives featuring employee participation or having a participation component such as Community 
legislation on collective redundancies/mass layoffs (98/59/EC), transfers of undertakings (2001/23/EC),  
national  systems  for  informing  and  consulting  employees  (2002/14/EC),  and  the  information  and 
consultation requirements of a slew of health and safety initiatives. 
2 In addition, we should note the evolution of case law via the decisions of the European Court of 
Justice as a result of which firms can incorporate in any member state even if their business activities 
are located elsewhere, as well as other EU legislation in the form of the 2005 Cross-Border Merger 
Directive (2005/56/EC) that facilitates the transfer of the registered office of an existing company to a 
different jurisdiction.  
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of  directors.  In  the  latter  case,  companies  would  not  have  to  adhere  to  German 
codetermination  laws  (whereas  an  existing  German  public  limited  company 
converting itself into an SE registered in Germany would have to stick to its current 
form  of  codetermination).  Further,  in  the  case  of  SEs  formed  via  cross-border 
mergers, or the creation of a joint holding company or subsidiary, a fall-back solution 
in the law stipulates that the most extensive form of codetermination should apply to 
the merged company.
3 This, too, might encourage companies to locate or relocate 
their new headquarters outside Germany. 
Despite  the  German  system’s  lack  of  attractiveness  to  other  countries, 
codetermination  at  company  level  has  held  up  moderately  well  inside  Germany. 
According  to  the  Hans  Böckler  Stiftung  (2009),  a  union-sponsored  foundation 
monitoring  codetermination  inter  al.,  as  of  2008  –  some  four  years  after  member 
states had to implement the Regulation/Directive (Germany, on this occasion, being 
two months late in complying) – 694 companies were still covered by the German 
Codetermination Act of 1976. But this number has fallen steadily from the maximum 
of 767 attained in 2002. Although some German companies close to the employment 
threshold for introduction of (quasi) parity-based codetermination have set up SEs 
with a single board of directors not including employee representatives, none of the 
large public limited companies in Germany that have turned themselves into SEs (e.g. 
Porsche,  BASF,  and  Allianz)  has  deviated  from  (quasi)  parity  representation  of 
shareholders  and  employee  representatives.
4  On  the  other  hand,  among  other 
flexibilities  provided  for  by  the  legislation,  most  companies  have  streamlined  (i.e. 
reduced the size of) their supervisory boards (see, in particular, Reichert, 2008). 
                                                 
3 Note that these are just two examples of the directive’s potential impact on codetermination. In the 
case of SEs formed through mergers (or via the formation of a holding company or subsidiary), it is 
also possible for an agreement between the special negotiating body and central management to result 
in  a  lesser  degree  of  board-level  participation  than  the  highest  proportion  that  applies  within  the 
participating companies.  All  that is required  here are the  votes  of two-thirds  of the  SNB members 
representing at least two-thirds of the total workforce. This option is not available in the case of a 
company conversion. 
4  For  details  and  examples,  see  the  foundation’s  webpage  (http://www.boeckler.de)  as  well  as  the 
recent analysis by Keller and Werner (2008). Somewhat in contrast, Stettes (2006) reports that in 2005 
every seventh newly-established private limited company in Germany was registered according to the 
legal form of the U.K., thereby avoiding German codetermination laws.  
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The fact that (quasi-parity) worker representation has neither been exported 
nor  abandoned  by  German  companies  would  suggest  that  there  are  different 
strengths and weaknesses of the system. Adverse consequences might indeed follow 
were  its  procedures  grafted  on  to  other  economic  systems  while  domestic 
consequences  might  be  benign  or  even  beneficial  if  problems  are  dealt  with  in  a 
timely fashion. The system may thus be better than its reputation amongst foreigners 
– or German firms could have learned to live with worker directors in much the same 
way as they seem to have done with works councils (e.g. Kotthoff, 1994).  
Although  evaluation  of  codetermination  strictly  transcends  economic  issues, 
our main task will be to survey the evolving empirical evidence on the performance 
effects of worker representation on supervisory boards. A second issue of course is 
the system’s sustainability in a world of globalization, changes in company law, and 
European  integration,  which  we  shall  also  examine.  Our  treatment  proceeds  as 
follows. We first  sketch  the  institutional framework  of  codetermination  at  company 
level in Germany before recounting the theoretical arguments for and against. We 
then  survey  the  empirical  evidence  on  the  effects  of  the  institution.  Next,  major 
challenges facing the institution are recounted. A summary concludes.  
 
2. Institutional Framework 
In the German two-tier system of corporate governance, the supervisory board has 
basically four functions (according to the 1965 Stock Corporation Act, Aktiengesetz). 
It  approves  the  appointment  of  management  board  members;  it  monitors  the 
management board (which has to inform it of the broad lines of business policy and 
corporate planning on an annual basis and of business operations on a more regular 
basis);  it  can  codetermine  business  operations  requiring  its  approval;  and  it 
scrutinizes the annual accounts of the company or group. 
Various laws and their amendments stipulate that differing shares of seats on 
the supervisory board be allocated to employee representatives, so that there exist 
three different regimes of codetermination at company level in Germany:  
•  full-parity  codetermination  for  the  coal  and  steel  industries  under  the  1951 
Codetermination Act,  
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•  almost-equal or quasi-parity representation under the 1976 Codetermination Act for 
corporations having more than 2,000 employees (where the chairman of the board, 
elected by the shareholders, has the casting vote in case of a tie), 
•  one-third  representation  in  companies  with  between  500  and  2,000  employees 
under the 1952 Works Constitution Act.
5 
The 1951 Act on the Codetermination of Employees in the Supervisory and 
Management Boards of Companies in the Coal, Iron and Steel Industry (or Montan-
Mitbestimmungsgesetz, as it is also known) established supervisory boards ranging in 
size from 11 to 21 members according to share capital, comprising equal numbers of 
shareholder and employee members and one neutral member, in such sector-specific 
companies generally employing more than 1,000 workers. Further, the appointment of 
a Labor Director (who serves on the management board) requires the agreement of 
the employee representatives. 
In 1976 under the Codetermination Act (Mitbestimmungsgesetz), equal but not 
full-parity  representation  (hence  ‘quasi-parity’  representation)  was  extended  from 
coal, iron and steel to corporations of all other industries where there are as a rule 
more  than  2,000  employees.  The  number  of  seats  on  the  supervisory  board  is  a 
function  of  employment:  12  members  if  the  employment  total  does  not  exceed 
10,000, 16 if it exceeds 10,000 but is less than 20,000, and 20 where it is greater than 
20,000. Election of the chairman and vice-chairman of the supervisory board in each 
case  requires  majorities  of  two-thirds  of  the  votes.  If  neither  gains  the  necessary 
votes,  the  shareholder  (employee)  representatives  elect  the  chairman  (vice-
chairman).  This  procedure  ensures  that  the  chairman  is  always  a  shareholder 
representative and he/she has an extra, tie-breaking vote (unlike the situation in the 
coal,  iron  and  steel  industries).  The  law  also  made  provision  for  the  inclusion  of 
managerial employees, who were given one seat on the supervisory board. 
The  1952  Works  Constitution  Act  (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz)  introduced  a 
weaker  form  of  codetermination  by  providing  for  one-third  representation  of 
employees on the supervisory boards of large and medium sized corporations with 
                                                 
5 We  should  note  that  the  rights  of  the  supervisory  board  in  limited  liability  companies  or  GmbHs 
(Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung) differ materially from those in joint stock corporations or 
AGs (Aktiengesellschaften).  
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more than 500 employees. The sections of the 1952 Works Constitution Act dealing 
with supervisory board membership in companies with 500 to 2,000 employees were 
amended in the so-called Third Part Act (Drittelbeteiligungsgesetz) of 2004.  
To summarize, the proportion of worker representatives on company boards 
varies from one-third, in companies with between 500 and 2,000 employees, to one-
half, in companies with more than 2,000 employees. In the latter, the chair in effect 
represents the shareholders and has the casting vote. The exception is the larger 
coal  or  iron  and  steel  companies  where  the  chair  is  independent;  hence  the 
expression  full-parity  representation.  The  number  of  members  of  the  supervisory 
board is determined either by the share capital or employment of the company or 
group.  The  election  procedure  for  employee  representatives  is  complicated  and 
varies  by  type  of  company  and  type  of  codetermination  (for  details,  see  Addison, 
2009). 
Finally, it should not go unmentioned that the codetermination legislation has 
generated  fierce  and  ongoing  employer  resistance,  and  companies  (as  well  as 
unions) have engaged courts at all levels on codetermination issues. For example, 9 
corporations  and  29  employers  associations  challenged  the  1976  Act  on 
constitutional grounds, as infringing the property rights of shareholders. The Federal 
Constitutional Court in its decision of March 1, 1979, upheld the constitutionality of the 
law, arguing that shareholder rights were protected because the supervisory board 
chairman  still  had  the  casting  vote,  while  noting  that  the  private  property  rights 
enshrined in the constitution had also to serve public welfare as might obtain from 
heightened  industrial  peace  and  thence  improved  economic  performance.  A  more 
recent example is provided by the internal disputation that marked the deliberations of 
the tripartite committee of inquiry into the workings of Unternehmensmitbestimmung. 
The body was unable to reach consensus because of sharp disagreement between 
the employer and union representatives, forcing the academic members to publish 
their own report (Biedenkopf Commisson, 2006). 
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3. Theoretical remarks 
In (continental) European countries, codetermination is usually justified by traditional 
political  and  social  arguments  such  as  the  “democratization  of  the  employment 
relationship” and by notions of “stakeholder value”, all of which imply that the interests 
of all relevant groups should be represented in a company’s board. However, even 
economic reasoning focusing on orthodox notions of corporate governance centred 
on “shareholder value” admits of arguments favoring codetermination. (On the two 
models,  see  for  example  Charreaux  and  Desbrières,  2001).
6  The  basic  orthodox 
economic starting point is that codetermination may be a safeguard for the employee 
side against opportunistic behavior on the part of employers. Absent some form of 
protection (either institutional or contractual), so the argument runs, employees will be 
unwilling  to  undertake  reliance  investments  such  as  firm-specific  skills  acquisition. 
The  upshot  is  that  in  circumstances  where  not  all  coalition-specific  resources  are 
owned  by  one  party,  codetermination  may  provide  a  governance  structure  that  is 
capable of dealing with maximizing agents with conflicting interests (Furubotn, 1988, 
p. 168). 
However,  the  codetermination  structure  envisaged  in  this  hypothetical  joint-
investment firm where the employees are residual claimants is voluntary. By contrast, 
under  mandatory  codetermination  major  control  rights  are  ceded  to  employees 
irrespective of whether or not they have made coalition-specific investments. Further, 
they are given no income rights in the firm, and normally do not share directly in the 
residual, and cannot transfer property rights in the job to others, and so on. Politics, 
so  the  argument  runs,  now  replace  economic  responsibility.  Employees  making 
decisions do not bear the full cost of their decisions. The situation is to be contrasted 
with a proper allocation of property rights in the joint investment firm – a sharing of 
control rights via codetermination – which assures that those making decisions bear 
the  full  cost  of  their  actions.  This  incentive  structure  promotes  both  productivity-
enhancing incentives as well as relatively lower transaction costs. 
                                                 
6 Our discussion will also sidestep the political economy literature and in particular the varieties of 
capitalism model and notions of institutional complementarities (see Hall and Soskice, 2001).  
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Yet, as we all know, such voluntary arrangements have not emerged. Why is 
this? For his part, Furubotn (1988) speculates that this is because employees can 
gain  more  from  the  political  solution  of  mandatory  codetermination  than  through 
private bargaining with the firm. After all, they get up to one-half of the seats on the 
supervisory board without any corresponding duty to invest. But the ‘no-show’ result 
has been exploited more generally by Jensen and Meckling (1979), who argue that 
employee board membership must be detrimental to shareholder value because it 
has not been embraced by employers. Indeed, they would see the force feeding and 
strenuous opposition of German employers to parity or quasi-parity codetermination 
as  testimony  to  their  indirect  argument  as  to  the  inefficiency  of  mandatory 
codetermination. 
Nevertheless  the  market  might  be  systematically  biased  against 
codetermination. The starting point is the argument by Levine and Tyson (1990) to 
the  effect  that  codetermination  will  be  underprovided  by  the  market  on  prisoner’s 
dilemma grounds. The maintained hypothesis is that codetermination is valuable to all 
firms but to sustain it a compressed wage structure and dismissals protection are 
required. In these circumstances, any single innovating firm will suffer an externality 
and adverse selection: its stars will be spirited away by ‘traditional’ firms, who can 
offer these workers higher rewards by virtue of their supposedly sharply differentiated 
wage structures, and it will simultaneously attract the work shy who are now protected 
from dismissal. On both counts, the codetermined firm will not emerge voluntarily and 
must be mandated.
7 
Another line of argument is more compelling because it explicitly recognizes 
rent seeking on the part of labour. Freeman and Lazear (1995) contend that although 
codetermination  raises  the  joint  surplus  it  raises  the  rent  going  to  labour  more. 
Employers duly resist codetermination and it has to be mandated albeit coupled with 
institutional limits on the ability of the employee side to extract rents. The inference of 
the  Freeman-Lazear  model  (which,  however,  is  constructed  around  betriebliche 
                                                 
7 A related argument, noted by Dilger (2002), is that voluntary codetermination might offer a bad signal 
to the market by indicating that the firm requires a ‘negotiation platform’ with its employees to effect 
major  changes  in  organization  or  secure  wage  concessions.  Although  such  changes  might  be 
advantageous, the downside is that they flag poor extant performance and might prejudice recourse to 
capital markets.  
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Mitbestimmung via works councils) is that the allocation of control rights to corporate 
assets may have important implications for economic efficiency but that the absence 
of the institution outside of a mandate is not necessarily decisive. 
Thus far, we have assumed an identity of interest between management and 
shareholders. What if managers are imperfect agents of the shareholder principal? 
Might not this provide a further basis for a mandate? One of the few analyses to 
exploit  such  agency  considerations  is  Jirjahn’s  (2003)  treatment  of  executive 
incentives  and  firm  performance.  Jirjahn’s  treatment  has  a  basis  in  two  key 
associations: first, the relationship between codetermination (in his model it is works 
council presence rather than worker representation on company boards) and self-
enforcing  contracts;  and,  second,  the  relationship  between  agency  problems  and 
trustful  employee  relations.  An  agency  problem may  have  a  commitment  value  in 
making  self-enforcing  contracts  feasible.  But  the  introduction  of  profit  sharing  for 
managers may give them the incentive to break implicit contracts with the employees 
on behalf of profit-maximizing owners with adverse consequences for trust. Where 
codetermination  and  self-enforcing  contracts  are  substitutes  (i.e.  the  reputation 
effects mechanism is strong), the impact of codetermination on firm performance will 
be stronger in firms with less severe agency problems. Since profit sharing reduces 
agency problems, the interaction effect between codetermination and profit sharing 
for  managers  will  be  positive,  and  hence  productive  of  firm  performance.  The 
converse applies where codetermination is complementary to self-enforcing contracts 
(i.e.  reducing  the  employer’s  incentive  to  renege  on  an  implicit  agreement)  and 
agency increases the range of self-enforcing contracts. 
Next consider active rent seeking. Such behavior on the part of management 
decreases  the  range  of  feasible  self-enforcing  contracts  by  hindering  cooperative 
industrial  relations.  Interaction  effects  again  depend  on  the  relationship  between 
codetermination and self-enforcing contracts in building trust. If they are substitutes, 
negative interaction effects are expected because, absent managerial profit sharing, 
codetermination may curb more ambitious rent seeking activities. Any such role for 
codetermination  is  attenuated  where  profit  sharing  provides  an  incentive  for 
management to establish trust. Where codetermination and self-enforcing contracts  
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are  complementary,  on  the  other  hand,  the  role  of  codetermination  will  be  more 
effective in firms with profit sharing. 
The  model  is  ultimately  inconclusive,  but  it  is  an  interesting  application  of 
property rights in the context of a contracts model.
8 Although they have largely been 
neglected, property rights considerations would seem to loom large in the area of 
employee  board  representation.  To  take  just  one  example,  inefficient  supervisory 
board  structures  might  dominate  diffuse  stockholding  in  circumstances  where  the 
alternative is labour-controlled boards. 
If Jirjahn’s model is firmly set in the framework of betriebliche Mitbestimmung, 
some recent theoretical models have examined board representation more directly in 
bargaining  models.  In  particular,  Kraft  (2001)  considers  a  model  in  which 
shareholders  bargain  with  employee  representatives  about  employment  but  not 
wages. In situations of oligopoly, Kraft shows that for some range of bargaining power 
in this oligopoly model a prisoner's dilemma exists. In short, the firm is better off under 
a  codetermination  mandate  irrespective  of  whether  other  firms  are  subject  to  the 
mandate, and yet all firms are best off if none of them is subject to codetermination 
(see also Kraft, 1998).  Kraft asks whether firms would have an incentive to introduce 
codetermination  voluntarily  (if  they  become  aware  of  the  effects  in  strategic 
interaction). Here he refers to the “many unfortunate aspects of codetermination” in 
terms  of  investment  and  finance  (Kraft,  2001,  p. 563).  He  also  notes  that 
codetermination is unlikely to develop naturally given the restriction of the model that 
bargaining be restricted to employment alone. 
A final theoretical development of the codetermined firm in oligopoly is offered 
by  Granero  (2006),  who  considers  a  duopoly  model  in  which  one  of  the  firms  is 
subject  to  codetermination  while  its  rival  is  not.  He  considers  the  implication  of 
codetermination for R&D and employment. There are two main theoretical results of 
this strategic R&D model. First, in the absence of bargaining but where there is a 
                                                 
8 In fitting a productivity equation to pooled data for 438 German plants observed in 1994 and 1996, 
Jirjahn (2003) reports that both codetermination and executive profit sharing are positively associated 
with value-added per employee, but the interaction term is negative. Accordingly, on this model at any 
rate, either profit-sharing reduces the commitment value of agency in situations where codetermination 
cannot foster trust without the cooperation of management, or management rent seeking is curbed by 
profit  sharing  and  codetermination  is  not  so  important  in  building  cooperation  in  circumstances  of 
reduced opportunism on the part of management.  
  10 
utilitarian management, the output best-response function of the codetermined firm 
shifts out. This can lead the codetermined firm to undertake more R&D investment 
(and more employment) if the degree of codetermination is ‘intermediate.’ Second, 
where there is bargaining – again over employment but not wages which are taken to 
be  exogenous  to  the  firm  –  the  increase  in  R&D  is  unambiguous  because 
employment commitments rule out any secondary reduction in employment resulting 
from  the  positive  effect  of  R&D  on  labour  productivity.  As  with  Kraft  (2001),  the 
relevance of the model ultimately hinges on the nature-of-bargaining assumption, but 
it  again  serves  to  demonstrate  that  theoretical  guidance  as  to  the  effect  of 
codetermination is not unequivocal. 
Finally, since Granero’s model alerts us to certain practicalities such as the 
‘threshold  value’  of  codetermination  (viz.  intermediate  rather  than  high 
codetermination), what other practicalities of German Unternehmensmitbestimmung 
have to be borne in mind? Corporate control rights in the form of votes are valuable 
(e.g. by analogy between voting and non-voting shares) but it is not clear that seats 
are valuable. Relatedly, and abstracting from the rarity of full-parity representation, 
only  almost-equal  representation  (rather  than  one-third  representation)  may  affect 
firm performance. Further, rent seeking can take a number of forms: codetermination 
may  be  used  as  an  inter-temporal  insurance  vehicle  protecting  employees  from 
adverse shocks and more generally by limiting shareholder’s flexibility. And if the U.S 
union literature (as reviewed by Hirsch, 1991) is applicable, shareholders for their part 
may take countervailing measures. They might increase firm leverage or they might 
even seek to change the remuneration of the supervisory board. The bottom line is 
not only that theory offers few single valued expectations but also that practicalities 
cast  a  long  shadow,  making  investigation  of  the  consequences  of  company 
codetermination a multifaceted exercise. 
 
4. The Empirical Evidence 
In  spite  of  the  importance  of  Unternehmensmitbestimmung  and  the  ongoing 
theoretical and political controversy inside Germany as to the consequences of the 
institution, the empirical literature on codetermination is still rather sparse. Three main  
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phases  of  empirical  research  can  be  identified,  differentiated  by  complexity  of 
research design, data sets utilized, and broad empirical results. 
Using  event  studies  and  non-parametric  analyses,  the  first-phase  literature 
suggested that codetermination at company level (measured by the introduction of 
the 1951, 1952, and 1976 Acts) had minimal impact on corporate performance. As far 
as Montanmitbestimmung is concerned, in comparing two industries subject to parity 
codetermination with the textile industry (which was not), Svejnar (1981) reported that 
the introduction of codetermination was associated with significantly higher relative 
earnings in one but not the other. Benelli, Loderer, and Lys (1987) report that the 
variance in annual stock returns in industries subject to full parity codetermination 
was lower than in other industries, 1954-1976, implying that less risky investments 
were being undertaken. But the difference between the two-digit industry groups was 
not statistically significant. Turning to the 1976 Act, Benelli, Loderer, and Lys in an 
examination of monthly portfolio return variances in 40 codetermined firms over a 
period before and after passage of the 1976 Act report a decline in variance, but the 
same  was  true of  the  control  sample of  18  non-codetermined firms.  And  average 
monthly stock returns dipped in both sets of firms prior to the passage of the Act. 
Similarly, analysis of differences in means among matched pairs of codetermined and 
non-codetermined  firms  over  an  interval  preceding  and  following  passage  of  the 
legislation  indicated  no  statistically  significant  differences  in  leverage,  profitability, 
dividend payout, capital intensity, and labour costs. Finally, in an analysis of variance, 
Gurdon and Rai (1990) found materially higher profitability (but lower productivity) in 
their sample of codetermined firms post 1976 than for the control group (of 26 firms). 
Each of the above studies attracted trenchant criticism for reasons that include 
sample size, data frequency (in the case of stock returns), lack of controls for other 
relevant economic or organizational variables, focus on a single event, and narrow 
reach.  The  hallmark  of  the  resulting  second-phase  literature,  consisting  of 
econometric  studies  and  events  analyses,  is  the  use  of  improved  data  and  more 
detailed  controls.  The  outcome  was  a  more  pessimistic  view  of 
Unternehmensmitbestimmung.  
  12 
The first two second-phase studies discussed here are notable for their use of 
larger samples of firms and regression frameworks. FitzRoy and Kraft (1993) estimate 
translog production functions for a sample of 112 firms using two cross sections of 
data for 1975 and 1983, namely the last year before passage of the 1976 Act and an 
‘equivalent’ (i.e. recession) year sufficiently long after event for the law to have taken 
effect. The analysis hinges on the 68 firms that had over 2,000 employees in both 
years  and  which  therefore  changed  their  codetermination  status  from  one-third  to 
quasi-party  codetermination.  In  each  cross  section,  the  dummy  variable  COD 
identifies  firms  with  2,000  or  more  employees,  so  that  the  change  in  the  point 
estimate identifies the effect of the change in the law. Note that the omitted category 
consists  of  publicly-traded  companies  (because  of  the  need  to  obtain  financial 
information) but since these are necessarily non-codetermined they are not typical of 
the firmament of such companies. 
The authors run three sets of regressions for each cross section: value added, 
total  labour  cost  per  employee,  and  return  on  equity.  In  a  final  regression,  they 
consider  the  determinants  of  productivity  growth,  1975-83.  The  value-added 
regressions record a significant coefficient estimate for 1973 and an insignificantly 
negative  coefficient  estimate  for  1983.  The  difference  between  coefficients  is 
statistically significant at the .10 level. That said, the labour cost regressions do not 
suggest  that  wages  increased,  even  though  the  COD  coefficient  estimates  were 
significantly positive in both years. Yet return on equity did decline significantly over 
the two years, while the total factor productivity equation indicated that the move to 
quasi-parity codetermination was associated with a reduction in growth. This was the 
first study to suggest that the shift to quasi-parity codetermination after 1976 might 
have measurable private costs: a productivity loss of just under 20 percent of value 
added.  Yet  the  rent  seeking  mechanism  does  not  appear  to  be wages  but  rather 
“increased job security and immobility” (FitzRoy and Kraft, 1993, p. 374). 
Results  consistent  with  those  found  by  FitzRoy  and  Kraft  are  reported  by 
Schmid and Seger (1998) when analyzing the market-to-book ratio of equity of 160 
large publicly-traded companies observed in 1976, 1987, and 1991. The comparison 
group is again firms with one-third employee representation. Unlike FitzRoy and Kraft  
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(1993), however, this study does not contrast the performance of a given firm before 
and after the passage of legislation but instead pools the observations and uses year 
dummies  and  control  variables  specific  to  the  firm  to  net  out  the  effects  of 
codetermination. (We note that this approach and the unbalanced number of firms in 
the various years is heavily criticized by Junkes and Sadowski, 1999). The coefficient 
estimate for COD implies an 18 percent decline in share prices. As the authors put it, 
shareholders would have been willing to cede around 22 percent of the current value 
of their pre-legislation investment to cancel that legislation, where this ‘willingness to 
pay’ is the market price of the loss of control rights experienced by shareholders. 
In contrast to the two regression analyses described above, Baums and Frick 
(1998) conduct an events study using daily stock return data, obtaining findings that 
are more in line with the earlier literature. Their study examines over a period of more 
than twenty years (January 1, 1974 – December 31, 1995) the outcome of 23 court 
decisions  concerning  application  of  the  1976  Act,  either  extending  or  restricting 
codetermination. (The cases in question were either litigated by the relevant industrial 
union or by firms seeking to reject the union’s claims.) In other words, the sample 
arguably  identifies  those  cases  most  likely  to  suffer  material  loss  as  a  result  of 
passage of the 1976 Act. The authors consider the abnormal returns on the event 
days – the date the judicial decision was issued – as well as cumulated abnormal 
returns  in  the  ten days  before  and  after  the  event  (plus  a  variety  of  longer  event 
windows), and also present regression estimates inter alia of the contribution of the 
type of decision reached (extension/restriction), the outcome (firm wins, union wins, 
or neither wins), the type of court involved (court of first instance, Appellate Court, 
Federal Civil Court, Federal Constitutional Court) and reach or ambit of the decision 
(affecting the firm only or having an economy-wide impact). 
Baums and Frick (1998) report that abnormal returns on the event day were 
modestly positive and were larger (smaller) where there was an extension (restriction) 
of codetermination rights, although in neither case were these changes statistically 
significant.  Cumulated  abnormal  returns  evinced  no  pattern,  and  were  not 
systematically related to type of decision. Nor for that matter did company success (or 
failure) lead to an increase (decrease) in abnormal returns on either the event day or  
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thereafter. Turning to the authors’ regression analysis, in no case were the structural 
characteristics  of  the  court  decision  statistically  significant  determinants  of  the 
abnormal return or the cumulated abnormal return. 
This issue of ‘employer friendly’ and ‘employee friendly’ legal decisions offers 
an interesting approach to investigating the consequences of codetermination. The 
fact that the authors were unable to find statistically significant stock market reactions 
to the verdicts, one way or another, is intriguing. The authors do, however, offer two 
possible reasons for their finding that stockholders did not experience financial losses 
due to legal decisions that extended codetermination rights. First a technical reason: 
the  judgment  dates  used  did  not  correspond  to  the  (unobserved  in  this  study) 
announcement  dates  on  which  information  about  the  disputes  or  lawsuits  was 
disseminated in the press. In short, the results may have been an artifact of the data, 
hiding real losses of stockholders. Second, the judicial decisions observed may not 
have  been  that  important.  More  important  in  this  respect  perhaps  were  the  dates 
corresponding  to  the  introduction  of  the  Act  (July  1,  1976)  and  the  ruling  of  the 
Federal Constitutional Court that the Act was constitutional (March 1, 1979). Acting 
against this latter interpretation, however, is the authors’ separate sectoral analysis 
that fails generally to detect negative (positive) changes in average abnormal returns 
in the sectors most (least) impacted by the Act, comparing the two-and-one-half year 
period prior to the introduction of the Act/declaration of its constitutionality and the ten 
days thereafter. 
The  most  detailed  study  of  the  effects  of  codetermination  on  firm  financial 
performance by Gorton and Schmid (2004) reaches more concrete conclusions and 
provides results more in keeping with the U.S. union literature (e.g. Hirsch, 1991, 
chapter  4)  other  than  in  one  important  respect.  The  authors  examine  the 
consequences  of  codetermination  for  the  largest  250  non-financial  traded  stock 
corporations in Germany using pooled cross-section time-series data for the sample 
period  1989-1993.  They  consider  in  turn  whether  quasi-parity  codetermination  (as 
compared with one-third representation) affects the performance of the firm – and the 
manner  of  that  influence  –  and  whether,  as  reported  in  the  U.S.  literature,  
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shareholders responded by taking countervailing measures (such as the assumption 
of increased debt) to offset the influence of the employee board members. 
The authors pay especial attention to the ownership structure of the German 
corporation  and  to  the  monitoring  function.  Some  relevant  distinguishing 
characteristics  of  the  German  governance  system  to  keep  in  mind  here  are  the 
importance  of  block  share  holding,  the  role  of  the  banks  in  controlling  equity  and 
corporate  governance,  the  composition  of  the  supervisory  board  and  the 
complications in ownership structure arising from pyramiding and cross-shareholding. 
This brings about a distinction between cash flow rights and control rights. In their 
study, Gorton and Schmid thus use the notion of ‘ultimate ownership.’ And ultimate 
ownership emerges as highly concentrated. In their estimating equations, the authors 
control for the equity control rights held by three types of (ultimate) owners that have 
been  found  in  the  literature  to  affect  the  stock  market  performance  of  the  firm: 
government,  banks,  and  insiders.  They  also  control  for  shareholder  concentration 
through  the  size  of  the  largest  existing  stake  of  equity  control  rights,  using  a 
categorical variable. 
In analyzing the effect of codetermination on the economic performance of the 
firm,  Gorton  and  Schmid  (2004)  use  two  forward-looking  financial  indicators:  the 
market-to-book ratio of equity (MTB) and Tobin’s q (i.e. the market value of the firm 
divided by the replacement cost of assets). But they range much further afield and 
also examine the effects of codetermination on company leverage, the wage bill-to-
employees  ratio,  the  employee-to-sales  ratio,  and  the  compensation  of  the 
management board and the supervisory board. 
Beginning with financial performance, their econometric estimation proceeds 
using a regression discontinuity approach. Familiarly, the principal codetermination 
regressor picks up the effect of quasi-parity representation as opposed to one-third 
representation. The authors present semi-parametric regression estimates for MTB 
and Tobin’s  q for each  of  the five  years 1989-1993.  In each  case,  the  coefficient 
estimate for COD is negative and statistically significant. The stock market discount 
averages 31 percent over the period when analyzing MTB, 26 percent when looking 
at Tobin’s q, and 9 to 15 percent when using a nearest-neighbor (peer group or single  
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firm) approach. These results imply that going from one-third to almost-equal worker 
representation appears to have very serious consequences for shareholder wealth, 
providing  a  backdrop  to  the  strong  opposition  of  German  employers  to  the  1976 
legislation noted in section 2. 
The  balance  of  the  authors’  analysis  is  given  over  to  investigating  whether 
codetermination  alters  the  objective  function  of  the  firm  and  possible  shareholder 
countermeasures. In seeking an answer to the former question, Gorton and Schmid 
(2004) examine the effects of board representation on managerial compensation and 
find that average management board compensation is contemporaneously negatively 
linked to performance (measured by MTB) in quasi-parity codetermined firms, and 
conversely for their counterparts with one-third employee board membership. As far 
as labour’s objectives are concerned, the authors’ regression discontinuity estimates 
point to an absence of any effect of codetermination on the ratio of the (log) wage bill 
to  the  number  of  employees.  This  result  is  attributed  by  the  authors  to  a  wage 
determination process that is conducted outside the firm at industry or regional level. 
But if codetermination has no measurable impact on earnings, material effects are 
reported for employment: Averaged over each of the five years in the sample period, 
codetermination  is  associated  with  a  48  percent  longer  payroll  and  a  55  percent 
higher payroll. The obvious implication is that codetermination results in overstaffing 
and success by the employee side in altering the objective function of the firm. 
In  the  final  part  of  their  analysis,  Gorton  and  Schmid  examine  whether 
shareholders take countermeasures that limit – presumably at some cost – worker 
appropriation  of  the  firm’s  surplus.  Using  their  nearest-neighbours  approach,  they 
report  that  shareholders  respond  to  quasi-parity  representation  by  increasing  the 
performance sensitivity of supervisory board compensation. That is to say, the pay of 
non-executive directors is more sensitive to firm performance when employees have 
quasi-parity board representation than when one-third of the board is made up of 
worker representatives. In the spirit of the U.S. union literature, the authors also test 
whether  leverage  is  higher  under  quasi-parity  representation.  Their  regression 
discontinuity regressions indicate that the effect of equal representation is to increase 
the debt-equity ratio by 69 percent on average over the sample period. Accordingly,  
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Gorton  and  Schmid  (2004,  p. 895)  conclude:  “Shareholders  attempt  to  align  with 
shareholder  wealth  the  interests  of  employer  representatives  on  the  supervisory 
board by linking employer compensation to firm performance and by leveraging up 
the firm.” 
Although Gorton and Schmid’s study has received some criticism by reason of 
its cross-section methodology (where firm-specific effects and survivor effects cannot 
be controlled for), the authors are able to distinguish between the influence of (quasi) 
equal  representation  and  firm  size.  Their  identification  strategy  hinges  on  the 
regression  discontinuity  introduced  by  the  binary  nature  of  the  codetermination 
variable. Specifically, equal representation is a discontinuous function of firm size (the 
number of employees of the group of affiliated firms) and firm size (measured by 
stock  market  capitalization)  is  assumed  to  have  a  continuous  effect  on  firm 
performance. By purging the data of the influence of firm size prior to estimating the 
influence  of  equal  representation,  Gorton  and  Schmid  (2004)  do  not  appear  to 
confound the effect of this type of codetermination with a size effect, subject to the 
caveat that their sample is restricted to only the largest firms (that is, they do not 
consider  firms  with  less  than  one-third  employee  board  representation  –  on  the 
possible consequences of which see below). 
Summarizing the literature up to this point, we might argue that the anodyne 
results  from  the  widely-criticized  first-phase  studies  have  given  way  to  improved 
estimates that tend to paint a much bleaker picture of the economic consequences of 
codetermination at board level. Although the evidence is not uniform, the balance of 
the second-phase literature seems to suggest that codetermination is associated with 
lower productivity, profitability and firm value. But, as is so often the case with studies 
of German institutions, a revisionist interpretation is actively under way, reflecting the 
insights  of  a  number  of  methodologically  advanced  studies  that  form  the  growing 
third-phase literature. 
In the first place, FitzRoy and Kraft (2005) have revised their earlier finding that 
the 1976 Act adversely impacted labour productivity (although they do not investigate 
whether the same holds true for firm profitability and the other indicators examined in 
their 1993 study). The authors now seek to control for unobserved firm heterogeneity  
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or  firm-specific  effects,  necessarily  neglected  in  their  earlier  cross-section  study. 
Using panel data for 179 manufacturing firms from 1972-1976 and 1981-1985 (i.e. 
pre- and post-1976 panels), they regress (log) sales on a codetermination dummy 
defined as firm size greater than or equal to 2,000 in both panels and an additional 
codetermination  dummy  defined as  codetermined firms only  after  1980. The  latter 
variable  thus  picks  up  the  effect  of  moving  form  one-third  to  quasi-parity 
codetermination, while the former variable is designed to control for any possible size 
effect  present  in  the  2,000  employee  limit.  Since  conventional  firm-fixed  effects 
cannot  be  distinguished  from  codetermination  effects,  the  authors  proceed  by 
allowing some of the other explanatory variables to be related to firm-specific effects 
and  others  not,  using  the  Hausman-Taylor  method  in  which  both  codetermination 
variables are instrumented. The authors’ Cobb-Douglas production function estimates 
suggest  that  the  switch  from  one-third  to  quasi-parity  codetermination  raised 
productivity by less than one percent. An alternative specification also allowing for the 
effect of one-third representation prior to 1976, defined as firms with more than 500 
but less than 2,000 employees, produced similar results for the change to almost 
equal parity representation (although the omitted category now comprises very much 
smaller  firms  than  before)  and  a  positive  coefficient  estimate  for  the  new 
codetermination dummy (subject of course to the caveat than no before-and-after test 
is employed here). On net, the authors conclude that they can now reject the view 
that the 1976 Act had effects that were primarily redistributional. 
Kraft and Ugarković (2006) basically repeat the exercise for the rate of return 
on equity. That is, their estimations use panel data for 179 companies from 1971 to 
1976 and from 1981 to 1986 applying the Hausman-Taylor approach. The authors’ 
results suggest that the additional effect of the introduction of parity codetermination 
to the initial difference between potential parity codetermination firms and the rest 
was a small positive value, implying a modestly favourable impact on the return on 
equity of the 1976 strengthening in the codetermination law. 
Another study that is very much in the spirit of FitzRoy and Kraft (2005) and 
Kraft and Ugarković (2006) has been conducted by Renaud (2007), using information 
on 250-500 companies from the German Financial Database, 1970-2000. Deploying  
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the dummies COD and COD80 and the Hausman-Taylor (1981) approach, Renaud 
(2007) provides three sets of regressions. The first offers a difference-in-differences 
analysis of value added and profits in which 1970-1976 is the pre-treatment period 
and  1980-2000  is  the  post-treatment  period.  The  second  seeks  to  determine  the 
effects  of  parity  codetermination  over  time  using  differences  in  the  trends  of 
productivity and profits in quasi-parity codetermined firms and the rest of the sample 
with one-third employee board representation. The third is a changing parameters 
model combining elements of the two former approaches. The results are as follows. 
The basic difference-in-differences regression indicates that the introduction of near-
parity  codetermination  increased  both  productivity  and  profitability  in  the  affected 
companies  in  the  wake  of  the  1976  law.  The  trend  estimates  of  productivity  and 
profitability  are  mixed.  Thus,  there  is no  suggestion  of  any  differential  productivity 
growth  favouring  quasi-parity  codetermined  firms  after  1980  or  indeed  any  initial 
differences  between  the  two  sets  of  firms.  For  profitability,  the  initial  difference  is 
actually negative and statistically significant but the trend interaction terms indicate 
that the profitability situation for quasi-parity codetermined firms improved after 1980 
relative to the control group. As far as the evolution of the trend is concerned, the 
author obtains no clear-cut and persistent differential effects. For both trend analyses, 
Renaud (2007) cautions that any observed trend differences between the two groups 
of firms might result from other unobserved influences on the two outcome indicators 
not captured by the specification. So perhaps the most reasonable conclusion from 
this study is that codetermined companies did not suffer from the 1976 law. 
Despite its use of cross-section data, the financial study by Fauver and Fuerst 
(2006) is arguably the principal contribution of the third phase. It can be regarded as a 
companion study to Gorton and Schmid (2004) with the advantage that the authors 
sample all publicly-held firms traded on the German stock exchange in 2003 (n = 786) 
and  take  account  of  varying  degrees  of  (optional  and  mandatory)  labor 
representation.  The  main  insight  of  this  study  is  that  prudent  levels  of  employee 
representation  on  company  boards  can  improve  board-level  decision-making.  It  is 
further argued that the potential payoff can be expected to be greater in industries 
requiring more intense coordination and information-sharing activities, and that the  
  20 
presence  of  labor  representatives  can  enhance  the  monitoring  of  managers  and 
thereby  reduce  shirking  activities.  No  such  favourable  inferences  are  drawn  with 
respect  to  union  representation  on  company  boards  (see  also  a  recent  study  by 
Werner  and  Zimmermann,  2005,  that  reports  a  significantly  negative  effect  on 
employment of trade union representatives on company boards). 
Fauver and Fuerst (2006) examine a larger sample of firms than Gorton and 
Schmid (2004), including firms without any employee board representation, albeit for 
2003 alone. The authors present a series of cross-sectional regressions using Tobin’s 
q, supplemented with logit regressions of dividend payment inter al. In addition to the 
key labour representation measure – namely the presence of one or more employee 
board  level  representatives  –  the  covariates  include  firm  size,  business  segment, 
geographic diversification, ownership concentration, bank board members, industry 
concentration, leverage (total debt divided by total assets), and several interaction 
terms. 
In  the  initial  regressions,  the  key  employee  representation  indicator  has  no 
effect  on  firm  value  as  measured  by  Tobin’s  q.  However,  when  interacted  with 
industries  supposedly  requiring  greater  coordination,  labour  involvement and  more 
specialized  employee  skills  sets  (together  process  complexity)  the  coefficient 
estimate  for  the  interaction  term  is  positive  and  statistically  significant  throughout. 
Voluntary representation, captured by a variable that takes the value of one where the 
number of employee representatives exceeds the legal limits, always has a positive 
influence on shareholder value. By the same token, union representation is uniformly 
insignificant.
9  As  far  as  ownership  concentration,  industrial  diversification  and 
industrial  concentration  are  concerned,  employee  representation  offsets  negative 
effects and amplifies positive effects on shareholder value. For example, employee 
board members appear to monitor and reduce the appropriation of small shareholders 
                                                 
9 Logit results are also provided for dividend payouts (circumstances where the firm pays a dividend 
=1,  0  otherwise).  Firms  are  significantly  more  likely  to  pay  dividends  when  there  are  employee 
representatives on the board and the interaction of employee representation with the operating income 
to sales ratio is also positive, which Fauver and Fuerst (2006) take to suggest that labour facilitates the 
payment of a cash dividend and mitigates appropriation by insiders and large shareholders. In short, 
employee representatives bring to the table a knowledge base that complements that of shareholder 
representatives.  
  21 
by powerful blockholders who would otherwise govern the firm to maximize their own 
private benefit. 
Returning  to  the  point  that  industries  requiring  more  intense  coordination, 
integration of activities, and information sharing benefit more from codetermination, 
there is some indication that employee representation that ‘weakly exceeds one-third 
but is strictly less than 50 percent’ in interaction with these industry indicators (e.g. 
trade, manufacturing and transportation) evinces a positive and statistically significant 
effect  on firm  value while  all  other  employee  representation  levels  are  statistically 
insignificant. So Fauver and Fuerst (2006, p. 703) suggest that ‘there is an inverse U-
shaped  relation  between  firm  value  and  employee  representation  on  German 
corporate boards.’ 
Finally,  and  abstracting  here  from  some  important  governance  issues 
(including managerial agency costs) because of space constraints, the authors claim 
they are able to reproduce Gorton and Schmid’s (2004) results when they restrict the 
sample  to  the  top  250  companies  and  use  these  authors’  measure  of  employee 
representation  (i.e.  quasi-parity  representation  =  1,  0  otherwise)  and  controls. 
Accordingly, Fauver and Fuerst (2006) conclude that the difference between the two 
studies is due to (a) sample size considerations, (b) the greater likelihood of union 
representatives  as  opposed  to  true  employees  being  on  company  boards  in  the 
Gorton-Schmid  sample,  and  (c)  the  interaction  of  complex  and  high  coordination 
industries and employee board representation neglected by Gorton and Schmid. 
While codetermination effects on productivity, profitability and other financial 
indicators have been investigated repeatedly, analysts have neglected the issue of 
investment which is the missing link in the study of codetermination and allocative 
efficiency.  With  the  national  innovation  debate  in  Germany  (see  Nationales 
Reformprogramm  Deutschland,  2005),  however,  the  role  of  company  boards  in 
influencing intangible capital has attracted some scrutiny. To date there have been 
just two innovation studies, both using patents as the output indicator and building on 
theoretical  models  of  strategic  R&D  introduced  in  section  3  (using  the  symmetric 
bargaining case). Kraft, Stank and Dewenter (2003), in an analysis of patent data for 
1971 to 1990 covering 162 stock companies (62 of which were codetermined after  
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1976),  report  evidence  of  modestly  higher  R&D  activity  (circa  4  percent)  among 
codetermined firms. And a similar conclusion is reached by Kraft and Stank (2004). 
But we still lack studies of investment in physical capital. Even if none of the 
studies  reviewed  here  has  obtained  evidence  of  higher  wages  under  quasi-parity 
codetermination,  several  have  pointed  to  lower  profitability  which  may  adversely 
impact  investment  in  imperfect  capital  markets.  In  the  interstices,  it  is  also  worth 
noting  here that  although  patents might  be  expected  to  exhibit a  relationship  with 
codetermination  largely  similar  to  that  obtaining  in  the  case  of  R&D  inputs, 
codetermined companies may patent, given their innovation capital, as a means of 
reducing rent appropriation. As pointed out in the U.S. union literature, patents offer 
the opportunity for firms to license product and process innovations, to transform what 
might otherwise be firm-specific innovative capital into general capital and thereby 
lessen  any  ability  on  the  part  of  the  employee  side  on  the  supervisory  board  to 
appropriate the quasi-rents from that capital (see Hirsch, 2004). 
Taken together, the main insights of the third-phase literature suggest that the 
negative productivity and profitability effects observed in the second-phase studies 
may  be  artifacts  of  cross-section  estimation  and  that  innovation  as  measured  by 
patents may be modestly higher in codetermination regimes (even if the latter result 
has not been supported yet by similar evidence on R&D inputs). Even more intriguing 
are the findings of the most recent financial study of the market value of the firm, 
which hold out the prospect that good corporate governance might include employee 
representation by virtue of the monitoring function and the reduction in agency costs. 
But equally, they raise some caveats such as the extent of labor representation and 
the  role  of  external,  union  representatives,  suggesting  that  optimal  representation 
may be below parity and should be restricted to internal representatives. 
However, a problem may arise with the identification strategy used by most the 
studies that relies on exploiting the change from one-third to parity representation. 
They  do  not  therefore  compare  codetermination  with  no  codetermination  but  a 
stronger  form  with  a  lesser  form  of  codetermination.  This  may  be  fine  and 
interpretation of the results would be straightforward if all firms in the sample really 
did  practice  one-third  representation  before  parity  codetermination  was  imposed.  
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However,  two  recent  studies  cast  serious  doubt  on  this  assumption.  According  to 
Troch  (2009)  and  Wagner  (2009),  only  about  60  percent  of  all  limited  liability 
companies in German manufacturing industries that fall under the Third Part Act meet 
the requirements of the law in having supervisory boards. This anomaly may affect 
the interpretation of the effects obtained in previous studies, but it also provides an 
opportunity for comparing companies from the same size class with and without (one-
third)  codetermination.  In  doing  so  and  using  a  sample  of  273  limited  liability 
companies in manufacturing, Wagner (2009) shows that one-third codetermination is 
not significantly related to either firm productivity or profitability. Although this study is 
limited  by  the  cross-sectional  nature  of  the  data  and  the  small  number  of  control 
variables available, it points to important topics that have to be addressed in future 
research (such as issues of research design and interpretation of results). 
 
5. Policy issues 
Notwithstanding  the  recent  surge  in  empirical  research  and  the  additional 
insights gained thereby, opinions of the main interest groups in Germany are sharply 
divided on the efficacy of quasi-parity codetermination. Although unions argue that 
codetermination  is  a  successful  cornerstone  of  the  German  model,  the  employer 
organizations  seek  a  ratcheting  back  to  one-third  codetermination  as  a  default 
position.  They  point  to  a  report  issued  by  the  Cologne  Institute  for  Economic 
Research (Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Köln) covering approximately 200 private 
limited  companies  which  concluded  that  parity  codetermination  was  a  source  of 
locational disadvantage. For example, roughly one-half of establishments with (quasi) 
parity  representation  indicated  that  the  participation  of  employee  representatives 
slowed  the  decision  making  process.  The  perceptions  of  firms  with  one-third 
employee representation were altogether more positive, even if a majority of both sets 
of companies reacted negatively to the participation of external union representatives. 
And  overall,  more  than  40  percent  of  all  companies  surveyed  viewed  mandatory 
codetermination as either a great or a slight obstacle to attracting investment and to 
mergers with German or foreign companies (for details, see Vogel, 2007).  
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The  union  side  has  reacted  forcefully,  buttressing  its  advocacy  of  a 
strengthening of codetermination (via a reduction in the 1976 Act’s employment size 
threshold)  with  favourable  commentary  as  to  the  impact  of  the  status  quo  ante 
contained in selected academic studies (including, for example, the commissioned 
study by Vitols, 2006). It has also pointed to commissioned survey results according 
to  which  74  percent  of  the  German  public  view  codetermination  as  a  locational 
advantage  and  82  percent  of  respondents  favour  the  status  quo  as  regards  the 
codetermination rights of employees in supervisory boards (Hans Böckler Stiftung, 
2004). 
Despite the research limitations and desiderata mentioned above, a tentative 
conclusion from our reading of the empirical literature would be that – at least in the 
past – the German system of codetermination at company level has not had (positive 
or negative) economic effects of a magnitude that would induce (other) companies 
(and governments) to adopt the system or to wholly abandon it. Now there is little to 
suggest  a  move  to  avoid  codetermination  at  establishment  level  –  see  Koller, 
Schnabel,  and  Wagner  (2008),  who  report  that  the  obligation  to  release  works 
councillors  from  work  above  certain  employment  thresholds  has  not  affected  the 
employment dynamics of German establishments. Equally, it is also widely believed 
that  most  firms  have  learned  to  live  with  company  codetermination.  Indeed,  one 
contemporary  survey  concludes  that  even  the  establishment  of  the  European 
Company  (SE)  offering  alternative  forms  of  corporate  governance  without  parity 
representation does not seem to have changed this: “At least for the time being there 
is no trend towards ‘escape from codetermination’ or its ‘erosion’, as is feared by 
(quite a few) trade unionists” (Keller and Werner, 2008, p. 169). 
But one fly in the ointment is the analysis by Eidenmüller, Engert, and Hornuf 
(2009a) of SE incorporations based on data collected directly from national company 
registers.  The  authors  provide  results  from  a  telephone  survey  of  SE  users  in 
Germany in May/June 2008, covering 75 percent of all SEs, supplemented with a 
broad-brush regression model of the determinants of SE formation in 22 European 
countries  in  2008.  The  telephone  survey  inquired  of  high-level  management  the 
reasons  for  their  companies’  incorporation.  From  the  survey,  codetermination  
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emerged as a very important motivation for incorporating for a variety of reasons: the 
freezing  of  mandatory  worker  representation  (in  medium-sized  companies,  where 
transformation  into  an  SE  before  crossing  the  threshold  size  to  stricter  forms  of 
codetermination  can  be  avoided  by  the  act  of  incorporation),  the  reduction  in  the 
number  of  supervisory  board  members  and  other flexibilities  (in  the  case  of  large 
companies), and the scope for avoiding codetermination altogether. Two other key 
reasons  were  the  availability  of  a  unitary  board  structure  and  transference  of  the 
registered  office  to  another  jurisdiction  (i.e.  corporate  mobility).  To  be  sure,  these 
reasons also have implications for codetermination but their stated rationales were 
corporate  cost  savings  (particularly  for  start-ups  and  closely  held  firms)  and  tax-
related considerations, respectively. Finally, although the authors’ separate country-
level regression analysis of determinants of the number of SE incorporations divided 
by the total number of firms offers more limited support for the legal arbitrage model, 
there is again some support for the notion that SE formation in Germany may be 
motivated in small part by a desire to reduce or even avoid the effect of mandatory 
codetermination. 
That incorporating as an SE is an attractive option is also demonstrated by 
Eidenmüller, Engert, and Hornuf (2009b) in an events study investigating the effect of 
Council Regulation 2157 on company stock market values (Tobin’s q). The authors 
use  data  from  Thomson-Reuters  Datastream  on  the  30  publicly-traded  stock 
companies  that  reincorporated  as  SEs.  They  present  findings  on  firm  level  and 
average abnormal returns in the day of the announcement of reincorporation (day 0), 
on the days on either side of the announcement (day -1 and day 1), and over all three 
days (-1, 0, 1), and on cumulative average abnormal returns for event windows of 
various lengths. Focusing here on the latter, Eidenmüller, Engert, and Hornuf find 
positive  and  significant  returns  for  the  event  windows  examined  suggesting  that 
reincorporation provided relevant information for a firm’s market valuation. At issue of 
course is the reason for these positive abnormal returns. Apart from the role of legal 
uncertainty (which should decrease over time) and reputation effects (the issue of 
image of a SE), both of which explanations are consistent with their data, the authors 
also examine the role of legal arbitrage as in their previous study. Specifically, they  
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seek to determine whether legislation that in principle allows a company to freeze the 
preexisting level of codetermination increases shareholder value. At one level, they 
again find support for legal arbitrage in that companies reincorporating in Germany 
constitute a clear majority of the sample (18 out of 30 firms) and Germany of course 
has  the  most  stringent  codetermination  rules.  More  fundamentally,  however,  the 
strong predictions of the arbitrage model are on this occasion not upheld. Although 
the  benefits  of  freezing  codetermination  should  a  priori  be  greatest  for  smaller 
companies,  the  rise  in  market  valuation  for  such  firms  was  actually  smaller  than 
average (although not significantly so). Taken together both studies seem to suggest 
that  incorporations  will  continue,  but  it  is  an  open  question  whether  avoiding 
codetermination is the main reason or just a side effect. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Worker  representation  on  company  boards  still  arouses  strong  feelings.  At  one 
extreme it is viewed as tantamount to wealth confiscation (e.g. Alchian, 1984, p. 46) 
with palpably adverse consequences for firm performance. At another, it is viewed as 
helping  guarantee  cooperative  labour  relations,  with  long-term  gains  in  terms  of 
productivity and improved worker morale. Intermediate positions would recognize the 
joint occurrence of allocative and distributive effects, permitting either increases or 
decreases  in  overall  welfare  (according  to  the  position  taken  on  the  ability  of  the 
German system to mediate the conflict between the two forces). The official German 
position would appear to be that codetermination is an essential and indispensable 
element of the social market economy. However, as we have seen, a recent high-
level tripartite commission charged with producing proposals on how to adapt quasi-
parity codetermination to changed economic and social conditions could not reach 
consensus (see Biedenkopf Commission, 2006; Hans Böckler Stiftung, 2007). 
Against this background we have considered the arguments for and against 
employee representation on the supervisory board. Theory offers guidance but does 
not allow  an  unequivocal  position to be  taken  on  the  issue, absent  very  stringent 
assumptions. As usual, therefore, we were led to consider the empirical evidence, 
tracing three phases in a still sparse literature. The first, comprising a mix of event  
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studies and non-parametric analyses, failed to detect any systematic effect of board 
codetermination  on  firm  performance.  The  widely  recognized  limitations  of  this 
research led to a second-phase literature comprising econometric studies and events 
analyses containing controls lacking in the earlier literature and richer stock market 
data. Although the evidence from this second phase is not uniform, the balance of the 
evidence suggests that codetermination is associated with lower productivity, lower 
profits, a lower market-to-book ratio of equity (and q-ratio), higher labour costs (if not 
wages),  longer  payrolls,  and  some  suggestion  of  shareholder  countermeasures. 
Finally, the most recent literature provides several reversals of finding and several 
new  results.  First,  there  is  the  suggestion  that  the  negative  productivity  and 
profitability effects observed in the second-phase literature may be artifacts of cross-
section estimation. Second, there is the suggestion that innovation as measured by 
patents  may  be  modestly  higher  in  codetermination  regimes.  Both  are  interesting 
findings  even  if  the  innovation  result  may  not  be  particularly  compelling  until 
supported  by  similar  evidence  on  R&D  inputs.  But  most  intriguing  of  all  are  the 
findings of the most recent financial study of the market value of the firm, which hold 
out  the  prospect  that  good  corporate  governance  might  include  employee 
representation by virtue of the monitoring function and the reduction in agency costs. 
But equally, they raise some very important caveats such as the extent of labour 
representation and the role of external, union representatives, suggesting that optimal 
representation  may  be  below  parity  and  should  be  restricted  to  internal 
representatives. The latter research is arguably the more fundamental and should 
inform the more conventional econometric studies more than it has to date. 
This,  then,  is  the  current  state  of  play  in  the  board-level  codetermination 
literature. Further progress in this area would seem to await more detailed analysis of 
German corporate governance, tantalizing glimpses into which are offered by both the 
theory  and  the  most  detailed  of  the  extant  financial  studies.  And  at  some  stage 
investigation of the interaction between board membership and works councils needs 
to be attempted, which is not an easy assignment given the size thresholds of even 
one-third employee representation and the strong direct association between works 
council presence and establishment size. Finally, researchers should try to examine a  
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more comprehensive set of outcome indicators while recognizing the limitations of the 
data. 
It the light of the conflicting evidence sketched above, it is even more of an 
open question as to how the German system of company codetermination will adapt. 
The observation that German employer organizations have intensified their lobbying 
activities  against  parity  representation  in  recent  years  (favouring  one-third 
representation as a default) may be a reflection of intensified world-wide competition 
on goods markets as well as of EU-wide competition in systems of codetermination 
as manifested in both legislation and corporate law. It also ties in with the insights of 
the recent study by Fauver and Fuerst (2006) that employee representation which is 
below  50  percent  may  be  better  for  firm  value.  Even  abstracting  from  employer 
efforts, the German system may have to undergo some changes because the decline 
in union density and works council coverage alike means that new institutions might 
have  to  arise  even  to  meet  EU  directives  on  measures  to  inform  and  consult 
employees.   
As a sort of litmus test of codetermination, it will be interesting to see whether 
codetermined companies in Germany will be as flexible and successful in adapting to 
the  challenges  of  globalization  and  of  the  current  economic  crisis  as  companies 
without  quasi  parity  board-level  representation.  But  even  if  they  cope  –  and  help 
maintain the nation’s enviable export success – the heightened degree of national 
controversy is unlikely to reassure already skittish international opinion of the efficacy 
of this particular German ‘product’. 
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